Cloud computing has many commercial advantages; however, companies tend to avoid trusting cloud service providers (CSPs) with their sensitive data because of the associated risks. Cloud infrastructures can be vulnerable due to a single aw in any node with networking, computing, storage and authentication services capabilities, which can result in the exposure of vulnerabilities with severe consequences. is paper reviews various recent articles and determines the most prominent security challenges. e paper also includes the critical analysis of existing solutions to determine their limitations. Using these identi ed limitations, a multi-layered security framework is proposed that can be integrated within cloud components to resolve data, virtualization, access control, insiders and service unavailability challenges. A theoretical evaluation of the framework is also conducted to explore its bene ts.
INTRODUCTION
A large number of organisations and individual users are moving their computing infrastructure to cloud platforms due to cost and performance bene ts [42] . Cloud platforms provides scalable storage and computation resources without buying physical hardware, which is essential for the exible requirements of many organisations. Up and down-scaling is easily provided and is compliant with user requirements. However, the vast number of users make cloud platforms an a ractive target for cyber-criminals, especially those seeking personal and sensitive data. Being accessible via the internet and poor security heightens the possibility of nancial, reputation, resources and data loss, should a cyber a ack occurs.
NIST states that cloud systems should be scalable, responsive, location independent, controlled, monitored and available without human operators [27] . Cloud computing and traditional servers are di erent as cloud platforms provide on-demand services and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. support a multi-tenant architecture. ere are three cloud deployment models: So ware-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). e SaaS application is subscription-based so ware run by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and accessed through thick and thin clients. e PaaS provides environments and platforms such as operating system (OS), databases, and network access, which are used to build applications and for general use. e IaaS gives access to a pool of hardware resources via a virtualized environment and is scalable with no single point of failure. Cloud platforms can be private, pubic, hybrid or community. Certain characteristics are necessary for cloud systems, such as: multi-tenancy, external storage, large-scale, on-demand service, virtualization and location independence [17] . CSPs are commercially available and common among individuals and organisations, but the reliability, trust, quality-of-service, diversity and security issues are a ecting their adaptability [29] .
A Cloud environment consists of di erent nodes [36] such as networking, storage and computing that operate together in order to provision cloud service. Due to a large a ack surface and number of dynamic components, the cloud remains in vulnerable state. A ackers are always trying to nd new exploits, whilst security researchers invest e ort to develop new ways to prevent and mitigate vulnerabilities. e a acks are become more sophisticated and there is a persistent need to recognise the latest security risks and update security policies accordingly.
Considering the aforementioned issues and broad nature of cloud infrastructure, there is a need to develop multi-layered security solution that can cover all possible vulnerabilities in real-time and simultaneously. is paper presents such a framework that focuses on data security, virtualization security, access control and identity management, malicious insiders and service availability issues by taking a modularised and synchronous approach. e rest of the paper is structured as follows: e rst section reviews existing cloud security related literature and determines the top ve cloud security threats. e second section identi es the problems and limitations in current solutions. e third section provides a design and explanation of the proposed security framework. e nal section provides a conclusion and explains the future work.
RELATED WORK
Each node of a cloud platform requires acute a ention in terms of security. All nodes are interconnected and compromising a single node can risk the entire platform. Cloud operations are data-centric and involve various aspects such as storing, accessing, modifying, sharing and analysing data. In this paper, we present a holistic understanding of research activity in cloud security and categorise previous research works. In order to achieve this aim, many recent publications have been analysed, which were selected from Figure 1 : Name of threats and amount of times they were mentioned in 100 papers.
high-ranking outlets such as IEEE, ACM, Springer and arXiv. By considering the security threats identi ed in each paper, it is concluded that Data Security (DS) is a priority concern of cloud systems. Following on, virtualisation Security (VS), Malicious Insiders (MI), Access Control (AC) and Denial of Service (DoS) a acks can be of critical importance. It should be noted here that 100 publications were reviewed to extract top-10 cloud security issues, which are shown in Figure 1 , however, only key citations are included due to space requirements.
Data held within cloud system is vulnerable to loss, breach, the and modi cation while at rest and in transit [37] . Resting data is stored in documents or databases, whilst data in transmission means that being transferred between devices. In case where the Con dentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) [33] of data is breached, and in addition to damaging the nancial state and reputation of the service provider, it could expose the sensitive data of cloud users as well leading to irreversible loss.
According to recent research [38] , data and information power entire businesses and various a acks on the system, such as ransomware, can easily undermine the fundamental operations. e data can be compromised in numerous ways. For example, virtualised environments are prone to a large number of a acks, such as virtual machine (VM) detection, hopping, escape, sprawl, rootkits, side-channel, SSH-based, distributed DoS (DDoS), recursive and nested VMs a acks [22] . e a acker can target user accounts, memory, databases and applications residing in cloud systems, and consequently violate the CIA of an entire platform. A acks regarding access control on either hypervisor or application level includes account/session hijacking, cookie stealing and password cracking [23] . By gaining access to an account, the a acker can impersonate as a legitimate user and perform malicious activities.
e user accounts are usually protected by single-step veri cation using a single set of credentials. is is a signi cant weakness as if an a acker manages to steal them, fully authorised access will be granted without triggering any noti cation.
Malicious insiders can have various roles in the organisation such as, administration, testing and developing. ese roles have di erent access levels and most of them are capable of compromising user data, especially as they understand the workings of underlying system, in addition to having privileged access [9] . For this reason, network, les, and server activities should be logged and monitored in real-time. Malicious insiders can also conspire against the organisation (also known as a collusion a ack [13] ) by sharing sensitive information with malicious parties. Using the information, the a acker can identify weak links or vulnerabilities in the system. e weaknesses of the system can be used to insert malware, launch denial of service a acks, etc. A DDoS a ack oods tra c towards a target to consume most of the available computing resources in server and prevent normal users requests [30] . e detection of DDoS a acks in cloud systems is relatively simple due to so ware-de ned-networking (SDN). e SDN has built-in ability to preform tra c analysis and centralised control alongside tra c sink holes [44] .
As the components of cloud platform are connected and dependent on each other to perform operations, the identi ed security threats are also correlated and target the same goal, i.e. to breach user data in cloud. It is important to cover and protect all points of entry from a ackers as each threat is capable of becoming a gateway to exploit the CIA of users' data. e existing solutions and their relations are categorised in terms of CIA model and presented visually in Figure 2 . e brief summary of these state-of-the-art approaches to detect, prevent and minimise security threats are explained in the following:
Data Security -Encryption is the most common way to ensure data con dentiality. Many symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms have been developed and improved during the past 40 years. e algorithms vary in required computation time, encryption strength, etc. It is also the case that their selection depends on user requirements and type of data. According to [38, 39] , variants of asymmetric (RSA) and a ribute-based algorithms are recommended for encrypting cloud data. Data obfuscating techniques can also be used, but it causes data in ation and network overhead, adversely e ecting the performance of cloud [12] .
Virtualization security -Most solutions present an integration of network-based proxy between the virtual environment (hypervisor) and cloud applications to lter-out suspicious network packets [18] . A proxy consists of di erent components such as e cient malware detection mechanism [35] , tra c monitoring [25] , and network activity analysis. In addition, by enforcing a VM instance to stay in allocated memory space through the hypervisor helps in preventing VM hopping a acks and compromising data con dentiality [21] .
Access control and Identity management -Current research studies are focussed on the stateless authentication of users in a cloud environments. Besides having a strong password and 2-steps veri cation, studies have proposed an authentication process using user-speci c a ributes and their roles in the organisation [46, 47] .
ese authentication schemes help in deploying secure access policies alongside resource management. Additionally, cryptography and key management is considered as an integral part of the access management [1] . Some schemes also create a credibility model and involve behaviour analysis of each user for access control [24] .
Malicious Insiders -e use of machine learning techniques in the monitoring of user activities is becoming an essential part of detecting malicious insiders [31] . e basic principle behind these approaches is to train the algorithm with normal and abnormal activities, and then use it to ag any out of the ordinary user activity [45] . Some proxy-based schemes such as data masking (both static and dynamic) and restrictive access to data items are also among suggested solutions [26] .
DoS a acks -e given solutions suggest that service unavailability a acks on web services, which are used by cloud platform, are more di cult to detect than on normal web-based applications [28] . A study [4] recommends an adaptive algorithm that, initially, learns pa erns of normal tra c ow and then becomes capable of identifying both internal and external anomalous network activity. Other recommendations are strong authentication process, packet analysis, larger bandwidth, rate limiting and Internet Protocol (IP) ags monitoring [8, 14] .
Lacking in existing security solutions
During the recent years, cloud computing has emerged to be an important utility for both personal and commercial use. In a similar manner, cloud security solutions have also become more sophisticated (as discussed in previous section). Regardless of the number and real-time implementations, there are still problems in existing solutions in terms of completeness, adaptability and practicality. Using the literature review, some of the issues are explained in the following:
• Although various searchable and fully homomorphic encryption schemes have been developed, their implementations are still limited and cannot be used in large-scale cloud computing environments due to requirement for large computation power, storage and communication. e encrypted data can also reveal partial information as it is not semantically secure [10, 41] ; • e light weight XML encryption, which is a type of partial encryption, requires the improvement in deciding which part is sensitive using an automated process. Without the automation, it would require a manual input to specify the sensitive sections for every XML document and rendered impractical;
• As cloud systems are distributed and might contain multiple networks, the intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) needs to monitor each node simultaneously to detect malicious activities and health of the overall system; • Cloud systems consists of a large number of nodes, and nodes can also added or removed from the platform. is dynamic nature makes it di cult to monitor each network packet as it will require massive computing resources. An e cient and intelligent mechanism is required to analyse network tra c that does not compromise the applications performance; • Due to the sophistication of DDoS a acks, signature-based detection is no longer a feasible detection mechanism. Behaviourbased detection techniques [34] are introduced as a replacement, but they require further research to minimising the risk of 'false positives' to ensure the continuity of legitimate tra c; • A ribute-based and stateless authentication of users are among the current research areas of access control and identity management in cloud, but they require improvements in maintaining a ribute privacy and collusion resistance; • Logical isolation in multi-tenant databases requires improvement as it poses a greater risk of exposing user's data by malicious insiders, such as administrators and so ware testers. Depending upon the access level, an insider might have full access to the data; however, it can be appropriately managed by transferring the complete data access rights to original owner; • In addition to insiders having access, the exposure of client s sensitive data to developers and testers is currently prevented by complex and time-consuming procedures such as replicating database, falsifying data and obfuscation. ese measures introduce large overhead; and • As suggested by [21] , the memory-privacy-protection scheme prevents VM escape and hopping a acks to ensure tenant isolation. e researchers implemented this approach on a Xen hypervisor. e problem is that it reuses many built-in functions of Xen, which are not available on other hypervisors. Implementing the same scheme on other hypervisors such as KVM in OpenStack will further re ne the concept and can result in a generic memory protection scheme.
SECURITY FRAMEWORK
In response to the identi ed security issues, a new framework is proposed to mitigate identi ed problems. As a single solution is not su cient to protect the whole cloud against the latest threats. Multiple security solutions have been designed and integrated on the various levels of the cloud platform to prevent, identify, and react to the aforementioned a acks. e physical layer starts from the right-hand-side and consists of physical machines. Proceeding towards le , it demonstrates the deployment of OpenStack cloud and provisioning the service to di erent tenants. e Figure 3 shows the integration of proposed security framework inside cloud platform. Each component is explained in the following section.
Explanation
is section provides a detailed overview of each component. We have chosen the OpenStack cloud platform because it is widely deployed in real-time environments, has a large user base, opensource and consists of independent projects that communicate with each other using RESTFul API [16] . e OpenStack also consists of standardised and generic components. Following section provides a brief discussion on deploying a OpenStack Cloud and then explains each component of the proposed cloud security framework.
Cloud infrastructure -e rst step is to create Ubuntu Metal-asa-Service (MaaS) server and connect a group of physical machines with it. All machines would also be physically connected to the central MaaS server via Ethernet wires. Next is to install JUJU soware for easy connection, con guration and scalability of multiple services such as MySQL, Hadoop, Tomcat, MongoDB, PHP and Python etc. At this point, the system is ready for installing and con guring OpenStack so ware to provide IaaS. e OpenStack has various services to manage and utilise the cloud such as Dashboard, Compute, Networking, Block Storage, Identity and Image Service [32] .
Proxy Server -Insider a acks are more damaging as they are familiar with the workings of an underlying system. To mitigate this threat, a proxy server is placed between the cloud and insiders, which will lter each access request based on a certain user-de ned security policy. Notice that tenants (users) do not require a proxy, and hence it would not a ect users' operations and adversely a ect cloud resources. is independent proxy-based solution can hide client s sensitive data based on who is accessing it. e proxy server will obfuscate, swap, substitute or provide false output. e users will be recognised by their a ributes, unlike other approaches that detect the a ack a er it has occurred [5] . e proxy server will pro-actively defend against illegal data or resource accesses.
Stateless a ribute-based authentication -is component proposes to utilise stateless authentication process for cloud applications, so that the cloud server cannot recognise a user's identity. Legacy systems only require a combination of two inputs; username and password strings, whereas stateless veri cation systems considers a large set of a ributes, o en automatically extracted from the user's request. e a ributes can be extracted from various categories [40] such as by describing the user (role, designation and department), resource/object being accessed (credit card, bank account and medical record), action being requested (update, delete and view) and environment (time, IP address and location) etc. With the help of these distinct set of a ributes, speci c policies are created to determine the user identity without needing his/her credentials. A similar approach can be taken to verify the users' memory space within the hypervisor. In addition, the process of authentication would be easy yet secure for the users [11] .
Encrypted communication and storage -To protect the privacy of user data, we recommend to use a XML-based encryption scheme that is secure, consumes less resources and is practical applicable in real-time cloud environment [6] . With the help of XML tags and labels, the sensitive parts of documents are easily identi ed and encrypting only those parts will lead to be er e ciency. Due to heavy presence of users, the most important concern would be to use less amount of computing resources without compromising the security, as proposed by [2] . It should also be noted here that data will be decrypted for both tenants and insiders group as they are performing operations and testing. However, for the insiders, the proxy server will either substituted, swapped or shu ed data entries as performed by [26] .
Memory privacy protection scheme -e memory protection is crucial for virtualization technology as multiple VMs are running on same hardware. It provides a way to control memory access rights and isolation among operating systems. In case of malware infection or hypervisor failure bu er over ows, the memory protection scheme will only prevent the data breach, but also a system's failure. We propose a scheme that can automatically identify user protected space, rather than asking for it manually, with the help of already available user a ributes. Each request sent to the hypervisor is uniquely identi ed using the similar stateless a ribute-based authentication, hence resulting in higher e ciency and usage to supports a large matrix of host and guest architectures. In addition, it is recommended to remove unused hypervisor components to reduce the a ack surface.
Strong logical isolation of multi-tenants -Multi-tenancy is a property where multiple users share same application along with services, databases and hardware. To avoid the data secrecy and integrity issues, the co-existing users should be segregated. is component of the proposed framework focuses on multi-tenant databases, which are created in a way that they reside in same server but logically isolated to eliminate the threats mentioned by [15] . It uses the Elastic Extension Tables (EET) and Universal Table Schema Mapping (UTSM) [20, 43] . At this point, the encryption and access control management will also play an important role to maintain restricted access and privacy policies on user and application levels. Automatic data mirroring and backup would also be created only on the manual request of users.
Distributed intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) -e traditional IDS/IPS are rendered ine cient for the cloud computing environments due to their high resource and time consumption in monitoring, detecting, analysing, and responding to the unauthorised activities operation cloud layers. is component of the framework proposes a real-time detection system that actively monitors for intrusions according to de ned policy and immediately ags any deviations. It does not audit data with delay, which makes it suitable for timely a ack detection. e component would be designed to monitor the whole cloud environment as a single entity, i.e. simultaneously monitors all cloud nodes. e system would also monitor and protect user accounts on cloud server using MIST and Malachi methods [19] . Both approaches can be implemented by either creating a dedicated VM within cloud or allocating a separate machine connected to the main router. e proposed scheme would also lead to the be er identi cation of DDoS a acks by reducing the number of false positives.
eoretical Case Study
To demonstrate the workings of proposed security framework, the assumptions are that (a) we have operational OpenStack Cloud Service, (b) it has more than one tenants and applications, (d) it has various system administrators with full understanding of cloud's internal working, such as node se ings and their IP addresses, and (e) an insider is trying to steal tenant's data. e scenario of malicious insiders is chosen due to their ease in launching an a ack. Consider a scenario where the insider knows the IP addresses of nodes, which are holding the tenants data. e insider request will pass through the proxy server as there is no other way to establish a connection with data nodes. e next step is the fabrication of attributes of legitimate users and bypass the stateless authentication scheme. According to [3] , it is di cult to impersonate a ributes and requires a large amount of resources. However, some methods are available to generate Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) tokens to launch a one-click a ack, session riding [7] , and authentication bypass. In this case, due to encrypted storage, the a acker would still be unable to retrieve the original data without the decryption keys. e multi-tenant databases are also strongly isolated with access controls, which ensures the prevention of any unauthorised access. Considering the a acker is allowed to access the data with decryption keys, the proxy server will obfuscate the data. Meanwhile, the distributed IDS/IPS is monitoring and logging all users activities. is framework will keep the user data safe and might identify the culprit.
Evaluation and Bene ts
By implementing the aforementioned components, the following bene ts can be achieved from the proposed security framework:
• All data queries of insiders such as administrator, developers and tester will pass through a proxy. It will execute the requested query, get the results, perform data masking and then pass the results to insider. In this way, the insider will not be able to view or manipulate user's data; • Login to cloud applications will be done via a stateless authentication process where the cloud server does not know the identity (credentials) of user. Due to this, even if the cloud platform gets compromised, the user identities and corresponding data will remain anonymous. Although it is not completely fool-proof, it would be very di cult to map data to its owner; • All data communication and storage will be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping a ack. e XML-based encryption will be used so that computation or any other desirable functionality can be performed selectively to increase the performance; • A dedicated system is solely allocated for the distribution and collective monitoring of all other VMs. Aggregated behavioural data from all VMs will help in determining DoS a acks, malware injections, as well as provide information on the overall performance of cloud. It will provide a centralized control to help improve performance; • Memory protection of VMs will aid the identi cation of malicious VMs, if one tries to access other VM memory space. It will help eliminate VM escape and hopping a acks; and • Multiple databases will reside in single large database server. eir access will be logically isolated to detect and eradicate malicious SQL queries.
CONCLUSION
is paper consists of a systematic research to perform the analysis of cloud security threats and proposes a multi-component framework to mitigate security risks at multiple levels of cloud platform. According to the literature review, data security is considered as the top concern. e data should always be kept con dential, available to users and unchanged during communication. It can be made unavailable, lost, breached, stolen and modi ed if it is not properly encrypted, has poor access control management, or stored on an insecure infrastructure. e presence of malicious insiders and denial of service a acks further potential damage of the CIA. e proposed multi-layered framework considers all these issues, and is created with respect to OpenStack cloud and its modules. e framework is designed in a way that can protect user s sensitive data with minimal resources. is research is in its initial phase and every component of proposed framework will be implemented and integrated. e goal purpose of suggested framework is to keep cloud secure without adversely a ecting performance.
